Information transmission and the emergence of a peculiar trading facility in certain emerging markets by Siddiqi, Hammad
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Information transmission and the
emergence of a peculiar trading facility
in certain emerging markets
Hammad Siddiqi
11. April 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23925/
MPRA Paper No. 23925, posted 16. July 2010 12:52 UTC
 
Information Transmission and the Emergence of a Peculiar Carry 
Over Transaction Facility in certain Emerging Markets 
 
Hammad Siddiqi 
Department of Economics 
Lahore University of Management Sciences 
hammad@lums.edu.pk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A peculiar carry over transaction facility has been associated with emerging markets of India 
and Pakistan. We show that the trading facility can be considered a market response to the 
information gaps in these markets. Information can be credibly transmitted through this 
trading facility.  Hence, the emergence of such a trading facility is, perhaps, an example of a 
creative market response to information problems. 
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Information Transmission and the Emergence of a Peculiar Carry 
Over Transaction Facility in certain Emerging Markets 
 
 
“[The information gaps] might change some of the performance characteristics, not to 
mention the institutional structure, of markets in which they appear.” 
Michael Spence, Nobel Lecture (American Economic Review, 2002) 
 
 
A peculiar carry over transaction (COT) facility is associated with prominent emerging stock 
markets of the Indian sub-continent. In this paper, we show that it can be considered a 
creative market response to the information gaps existing in these emerging equity markets. 
The trading facility is perhaps a vehicle for credible information transmission. Hence, it 
serves to eliminate information gaps. In this sense, the trading facility provides one example 
of how information gaps change the structure of markets in which they appear. 
 Ever since Akerlof (1970), it has been argued that information flows are necessary 
for markets to function properly in a world of asymmetric information. If buyer and seller 
have different information regarding the value of the item to be exchanged, a “lemons 
market” may arise. Unable to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality goods, buyers 
may not be willing to pay a price that elicits the supply of anything other than the lowest-
quality items. Consequently, potential gains from trade may go unrealized. A large number of 
papers in economics and finance have identified various information transmission 
mechanisms operating in financial markets. See Riley (2001) for a survey. In this paper, we 
identify one such mechanism associated with the emerging equity markets of India and 
Pakistan. The mechanism operates in the form of a peculiar COT facility. 
The COT facility, known as badla in local parlance, allows carry forward of open 
positions from one settlement date to the next. The party carrying forward its position pays a 
charge called the badla rate. An example clarifies. Suppose an investor buys 100 shares of 
stock X on Monday at Rs 1000 per share. Assume the settlement system is T+2, which 
means that the payment and delivery takes place two days after the transaction. That means, 
in our example, the investor is required to pay Rs 100,000 on Wednesday to the seller in 
exchange for the shares. If he does not have enough funds on Wednesday, he could defer 
settlement till the next settlement date (Friday) by using the following process: The badla 
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financier pays the money and takes delivery from the seller1, however, at the same time, the 
financier sells the shares to the investor at a price in excess of Rs 100,000. Since the sale will 
be settled on the next settlement date, the investor benefits as his open buy position has 
been carried forward.  The financier benefits since the purchase price is set to be in excess of 
Rs 100,000. The annualized percentage excess amount is termed the badla rate. The financier 
holds the shares as collateral till settlement.   
The badla first emerged in the Bombay Stock Exchange, which is the oldest stock 
exchange in Asia. The Bombay Stock Exchange formally started operations in 1875. The 
history of badla can be traced back to that period. Badla remained in its original form in the 
Indian markets till the mid 90s when reforms were first introduced with an objective of 
better managing the default risk (Somanathan (1998)). It remained in its original form in the 
Pakistani markets till 2005. In its original form, badla could be used to carry forward 
transactions indefinitely and there were no margins. With reforms, badla trade was limited to 
90 days and some margin requirements were introduced (Somanathan (1998)). However, the 
margin requirements were small and never exceeded 5% in the case of Pakistan and 10% in 
the case of India. Even such small margin requirements were not effectively enforced. 
The key feature of badla system is the exposure of badla financier to counterparty 
risk. The risk is difficult to manage, between the transaction and settlement dates, since the 
clearing house does not guarantee this transaction. The counterparty (investor) is more likely 
to be forced into a default precisely when the collateral is eroded. That is, in a sharply falling 
market. 
 Badla is not a call option since the financee is obligated to pay the financier and take 
delivery of shares on expiry, whereas in a call option, payment and delivery is at the 
discretion of the buyer. Badla is not equivalent to a futures contract since, in a futures 
contract, exchange is the counterparty to each transaction (and enforces margin 
requirements), whereas, a badla contract, is effectively between a financee and a financier.  
Badla appears strange in the context of a spot market since it effectively superimposes a 
feature of the futures market (settlement in the future) onto the spot market. Badla is not like 
any derivative instrument (option, futures contract, or forward contract) as with a derivative 
                                                 
1
 The per-share amount paid by the financier depends on the closing price on Wednesday. In our example, 
we assume that this price is equal to the price on Monday for simplicity. However, if it is lower, the 
financier pays the lower price and the investor pays the difference.  
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contract, the settlement price is known in advance. Whereas in badla, the final settlement 
price (and even the date) is unknown. Hence, unlike derivatives, badla cannot be used for 
hedging purposes. To our knowledge, such a carry over transaction facility has never existed 
in any other stock market outside of India and Pakistan. 
 To appreciate how peculiar this COT facility is in the context of a stock market, 
consider the standard leveraging instrument typically used in other stock markets; margin 
financing. Margin financing is a loan against shares with margin requirements and margin 
calls. Under margin financing, typically a broker gets a credit line from the bank, from which 
loans are given out to clients. An example clarifies. Suppose a client has a portfolio worth 
Rs.100,000 with a broker. If the margin requirement is 50%, he can get a loan of Rs 50,000 
from the broker (who in turn gets it from a bank) by pledging his portfolio of Rs 100,000 as 
collateral. If share prices fluctuate, margin calls are made so as to keep the value gap between 
the shares and the loan higher than a certain percentage. In the US, minimum margin 
requirements are set by the Federal Reserve Board. Margin financing is a much safer 
instrument since exchange is involved in controlling risk through margin calls and the 
amount of loan given out is a fraction (typically 50%) of the value of shares pledged as 
collateral. Margin financing is essentially a loan against shares already owned by the 
borrower. In contrast, badla, is not a loan against shares already “owned” by the borrower. It 
is a carry over transaction facility that typically by-passes the exchange. So, badla financier 
bears all the risk with hardly any margin involved. Badla facilitates a carry forward transaction 
in which the financier is fully exposed to the default risk whereas a margin financier is in a 
much more secure position since exchange manages the default risk through margin calls 
and margin requirements. 
How large is the counterparty risk faced by the financier? The counterparty risk is 
significant and has resulted in various payment crises in both India and Pakistan. In one 
instance, in May 2000, in a chain reaction, several brokers (who were also badla financiers) in 
the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) defaulted as share prices fell and badla borrowers could 
not pay up. In another instance, KSE remained practically closed for several months in 2009 
when a crisis linked to badla led to the imposition of a price floor. Similar crises linked to 
badla happened in major bourses of India too. Due to the crises caused by the counterparty 
risk, authorities in both India and Pakistan tried to eliminate Badla several times. In both 
India and Pakistan, after each ban, badla was started again in a modified form with an 
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objective of better managing the counterparty risk. Eventually badla was officially banned 
from Indian markets in 2001, and from the Pakistani markets in 2009. However, it still 
continues without the official approval in both countries.2 Presently, a debate is raging in 
Pakistan to once again give an official nod to badla.    
 Typically, badla is considered a facility that relaxes the short term liquidity constraint 
of investors. In this paper, we argue that there is much more to the story of badla than meets 
the eye. We show that badla maybe a vehicle for credible information transmission from 
brokers (who are the main financiers) to general investors. The emergence and subsequent 
thriving career of badla in the sub-continent can be considered a creative market response to 
information gaps that plague the markets of this region.  
As mentioned earlier, an interesting fact is that financiers are typically brokers. Why 
don‟t other financial institutions participate in this market, especially when such participation 
has been actively sought by regulators?  It appears that brokers get some benefit from badla, 
which is not available to others. This perception is further re-enforced, when one realizes, 
that the official banning of badla has been fiercely resisted by the broker community 
whenever such a ban is proposed (Echeverri-Gent (2001)).  Another feature is that badla 
volumes vary substantially from stock to stock but badla rates are typically the same across 
stocks.3 
 In this paper, we argue that the benefits available to the broker community are two-
fold from providing badla finance. One type of benefit is easy to see, however, the other type 
is more subtle. Firstly and quite plainly, badla finance relaxes the short-term liquidity 
constraint faced by certain investors. This increases the transaction volume. As brokers 
charge a commission on transactions, income of brokers goes up. Secondly, and perhaps, 
more importantly, badla is an instrument that brokers use to credibly transmit information to 
investors. It is likely that brokers have superior information about the value of shares. They 
have dedicated research departments who specialize in building networks with managers of 
the firms. Insider-trading is practically not considered a crime in these markets and brokers 
are widely believed to aggressively seek such information. Khwaja and Mian (2005) have 
shown that brokers make substantially large profits when they trade on their own account 
when compared to the gains accruing to clients when they act as intermediaries for them. 
                                                 
2
 Badla come back via margin trading, The Financial Express, Aug.19, 2002. 
3
 Data on badla is available at www.kse.org.pk. 
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However, whether a broker is trading on his own account or trading on behalf of a client is 
not public information and this way of transmitting information is not credible either for 
obvious reasons.  
We argue that badla provides a unique and credible way of transmitting this 
information. The amount of badla available in each stock is public information and the 
broker-financier faces significant counterparty risks. The existence of counterparty risk 
makes information transmission credible. Furthermore, counterparty risk is lower for high 
value stocks when compared with low value stocks. If marginal counterparty risk is inversely 
related to the quality of the stock as a vehicle for badla investment, signaling equilbria can 
exist as the „single crossing property‟ is satisfied. So by providing more badla in high value 
stocks, the broker-financier can credibly transmit his private information. Stocks are re-
valued in the light of transmitted information. Consequently, the broker‟s commission goes 
up. 
If one considers the history of badla (started in Indian markets in the 19th century), an 
interesting fact emerges. Badla has always been supported by the broker-community and 
considered an essential aspect for the proper functioning of market except for one instance 
in Pakistan. In early 2009, brokers at the Karachi Stock Exchange (main stock exchange in 
Pakistan) signed a petition calling for the official banning of badla. What were the reasons 
behind this sudden change of heart? We will see that an earlier decision by the regulator to 
cap badla volumes may have played a role. The regulator placed an upper limit on badla 
volume to limit the systematic risk; however, it may have had an unintended consequence of 
changing brokers‟ opinion about it, as we will see in the model. 
Badla is not only useful because it transmits information and leads to proper 
valuation of stocks but is also directly productive to the broker-community as its leads to an 
expansion in trading volume due to relaxation of the short-term liquidity constraint. Hence, 
badla falls in the category of productive signaling. Spence (1973) introduced the idea of 
signaling in the context of education. The idea has been widely applied since then.  However, 
in contrast to Spence (1973), the model presented here identifies signaling equilibria which 
are productive. Another example of a paper with productive signaling equilibria is Ben-
Shahar (2008), who identifies maintenance costs in the property market as a signal of private 
information.  
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Typically, models that identify signaling equilibria usually identify non-productive 
equilibria.  Ross (1977) identifies the management‟s choice of debt level as a possible 
indicator of true value to outsiders. Leland and Pyle (1977) point out that the amount of self-
financing by entrepreneurs can be a credible indicator of value. Bhattacharya (1979), Meyers 
and Majluf (1984), Vermaelen (1984), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) 
are other examples of models in which managers successfully transmit their private 
information to outsiders through various credible signals. Literature on signaling is wide and 
varied.  Some examples are Choi (2001), Lutz (1989), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). For a 
survey, see Riley (2001).  
 The emergence of a peculiar COT facility in prominent emerging markets is an 
interesting phenomenon well worth studying. However, despite its interesting role, little 
academic research exists on the topic. To our knowledge, the only published article directly 
concerned with badla is Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998).  They empirically study the impact 
of banning and re-starting badla on volumes and prices in the Bombay Stock Exchange. To 
our knowledge, the model presented in this paper is the first ever theoretical study aimed at 
explaining the emergence and subsequent thriving career of this peculiar COT facility as an 
information transmission mechanism.  
 
1. The Model 
 
In this section, we present a model in which there are only two types of firms. The model is 
generalized to infinitely many types in section 2.  
Type 1‟s profit is characterized by a random variable X, which is uniformly 
distributed on [0,d], whereas type 2‟s profit is uniformly distributed on [0,c]. Type 1 is 
superior to type 2 in the following way: d>c. At the beginning of each period, nature decides 
whether a given firm is of type 1 or type 2. The profits are realized at the end of each period. 
There is a representative broker who is also a badla-financier. At the beginning of each 
period, he chooses how much badla to provide in each type of stock. The broker-financier 
observes nature‟s move, but the move is not observed by the market. Each firm is a going 
concern (lives forever).  
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Figure 1 shows the game in extensive form. Three things happen at the beginning of 
each period. Firstly, nature (N) makes it move and decides the type of a given firm. The  
move is observed by the broker-financier but not by the market. Secondly, the broker-
financier (BF), chooses the amount of badla finance (B) to provide. This move is observed by 
the market. Thirdly, market (M) determines the value of the firm (V(B)) and in doing so 
indirectly affects the commission income of the broker. At the end of the period, profit of 
the given firm is realized. The frequency of type 1 firms is assumed to be „a‟, with a<1, at any 
give point in time, so frequency of type 2 firms is „1-a‟. Without any loss of generality, we 
assume, a=0.5. 
Figure 2 shows a particular instance of the game over two time-periods. As can be 
seen, nature makes a move (at time 0) and decides that the firm is of type 1. So, its profit is 
realized, at time 1, from the interval [0,d]. The nature moves again and decides, at time 1,  
 N 
 
Type 1 
(a) 
 
Type 2 
(1-a) 
 BF 
 BF 
B 
B 
 M 
 M 
V(B) 
V(B) 
Figure 1 
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that the firm is of type 2. Consequently, its profit is realized from the interval [0,c] at time 2. 
The game continues each period with the type randomly decided at the beginning of each 
period and profits appropriately drawn at the end of each period. Firms are dynamic entities 
and their profitability is never a constant. Fluctuation in type can be interpreted as changes 
in the environmental factors affecting a firm‟s profitability.  
If at time 0, the type of a given firm is revealed as type 1, its market value is: 
)1()1(4)1(2
1
rrr
dc
r
d
V








        (1) 
Where  is the coefficient of risk aversion, and r is the discount rate.  
Similarly, the market value of a type 2 firm is: 
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        (2) 
Clearly, 21 VV  . 
 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
Type 2 
Type 1 ],0[ dX   ],0[ dX   
],0[ cX   ],0[ cX   
Firm 
Figure 2 
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We assume (without any loss of generality) that, in the beginning of each period, the total 
volume of transactions processed by the broker in each firm, in the absence of badla 
financing, is exactly equal to the market value of the firm,  
That is, 
VfIncomeCommission          (3) 
Where 10  f represents the commission percentage (usually 2%) of the broker. 
Apart from intermediating, the broker is also a badla financier. Broker-financier provides 
badla for one period. Badla relaxes the short-term liquidity constraint faced by the market; 
hence, it enhances the trading volume. Consequently, the broker-financier‟s commission 
income goes up: 
BfBVfIncomeCommission  )(        (4) 
Equation (4) shows that badla is not only a potential signal (as it may transmit information) 
but is also productive for the broker as it directly increases his commission income. 
However, badla creates counterparty risk for the broker-financier. Badla is a debt given by the 
broker-financier to the market. If the profit realized at the end of the period is large enough 
to cover badla payment along with interest on badla, i , the broker-financier gets his money 
back along with interest, otherwise he may lose a part/all of interest or/and a part/all of his 
badla investment. In general, there are three possibilities:  
XBLossBadlaBXIf
BXIncomeBadlaiBBXBIf
iBIncomeBadlaiBBXIf



,
,
,
      (5) 
Using k to denote the type of the firm, that is,  dck , , expected badla income is: 
 
k
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iBIncomeBadlaExpected
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iBdX
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11
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22
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So, total payoff of the broker-financier is:4 
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22
       (7) 
 
                                                 
4
 Here, we have assumed that the broker-financier is risk neutral. The analysis can easily be extended to the 
case of a risk averse broker-financier, however, such an extension does not add any value to the analysis. 
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In practice, the badla rate i , is typically not too high from the risk-free rate. The badla market 
does not get much attention from banks, DFIs, and other financial institutions lending 
support to the theory that the badla market is not attractive in its own right. It is likely that it 
serves some other purpose (signaling?) for the broker-financier. Given that the commission 
percentage is small (typically 2%), and due to the low return on badla, we assume that badla 
market is not attractive enough in its own right for the broker-financier. Specifically, we 
assume: 
0
2
)1(
)1(
1
22
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Or equivalently, 
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Here, we have assumed that the broker-financier does not trade on his own behalf. This is a 
simplification only and does not affect the results. If we allow the broker-financier to trade 
on his own account then the incentive to signal the high type will be stronger due to the 
capital gains accruing to him from his own position. For example, if the total funds available 
with the broker-financier are I, and the badla amount needed to signal the high type is B, it is 
optimal for him to invest I-B in the high type. 
So, badla financing is costly to the broker-financier due to the counterparty default 
possibility. And, return on badla is not large enough to counter it. However, badla is relatively 
more costly for the lower type (type 2). Can this difference in cost lead to credible 
transmission of information?  
Proposition 1 provides an answer. 
 
Proposition 1 A separating equilibrium exists in which the broker-financier provides 
a positive amount of badla finance in type 1 and no badla finance is provided in  
type 2. The market correctly infers the type of each firm in equilibrium. The amount 
of badla provided in type 1 is 
 
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Proof. In general, the following steps are involved in identifying a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (separating equilibrium is one example): 
1) Specify beliefs of the receiver (market in our case). 
2) Propose a strategy profile 
3) Check to see that the strategy profile involves the best response of each player and the 
beliefs of the receiver satisfy Bayes rule.  
 
In our case, market‟s beliefs are specified as: 
1]|2[1]|1[  BBTypeFirmPandBBTypeFirmP  
 
The proposed strategy profile is: 
021
)()( 21
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For a separating equilibrium to exist, it must be true that the broker-financier has no 
incentive to deviate from providing no badla in type 2 to providing badla equal to B in type 2. 
That is, the following inequality must be satisfied: 
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The right hand side of the above inequality is the payoff to the broker-financier if he 
provides no badla and the left hand side is his payoff from providing badla equal to B in 
type2.  
The inequality is binding at  
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The broker-financier will not exceed the threshold specified by (10) in type 2. So, if badla 
slightly in excess of 
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type-1, and no badla is provided in type 2 (since providing badla in type-2 will further lower 
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the income of the broker-financier), then full discrimination of the types takes place and a 
separating equilibrium exists. Providing B in type 1 is feasible since d>c implying 
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Badla finance, as an instrument, can be used to credibly transmit information, as the model 
shows. In this sense, it can be considered a creative market response to the information gaps 
existing in prominent emerging markets of South Asia.   
In emerging markets, the question of information transmission becomes even more 
important since legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flow as pointed 
out in Black (2001) typically do not exist. It is clear, even to a causal observer, that ground 
realities in emerging markets are very different from the developed markets. How do these 
markets respond? How do they continue to function? Perhaps, emerging markets respond by 
developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. That is, mechanisms unique to 
them. Badla is one example of an endogenously emerged mechanism that may serve the 
crucial need of information transmission. 
Next, we show that there also exists a continuity of pooling equilibria in which no 
information transmission takes place.  
 
Proposition 2 There exists a continuity of  pooling equilibria in which no information 
transmission takes place. Each point in the interval  ],0[ *B can support a pooling 
equilibrium. 
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Proof. As mentioned in the proof of proposition 1, there are three steps in identifying 
perfect Bayesian equilibria. In this case, beliefs of the receiver (market) are: 
5.0]|2[5.0]|1[,1]|2[ ***  BBTypeFirmPandBBTypeFirmPBBTypeFirmP  
 
The proposed strategy profile is: 
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Given that the most tempting deviation for the broker-financier in type 2 from *B  is to 0, the 
value of *B is determined from the incentive constraint faced by the broker-financier in 
type2 as follows: 
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In (11), the R.H.S is the broker-financier‟s payoff from providing no badla in type 2. The 
L.H.S. is the broker-financier‟s payoff from providing badla equal to *B . Solving for *B : 
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Beyond this value, the broker-financier has an incentive to deviate from the pooling 
equilibrium in type 2.  
▄  
 
Corollary 1 The pooling equilibrium at B=0 is superior to other pooling equilibria 
from the point of view of the broker-financier. 
 
Proof.  Follows directly from the assumption 0
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We mentioned in the introduction that, quite extra-ordinarily, brokers at the Karachi Stock 
Exchange signed a petition, in early 2009, calling for the elimination of badla. . Perhaps, in 
the light of our model, the earlier decision to cap badla volumes may have played a role. 
Since *B < B , plausibly badla capping might have forced a pooling equilibrium. As pooling at 
B=0 is better for the broker-financier, enthusiasm for badla, in the broker community, 
subsequently faded. 
 So far, we have discussed the model with two types only. The model can be 
generalized to include infinitely many types. This is done in the next section. 
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2. The General Model with Infinitely Many types 
 
Finding pooling equilibria for infinitely many types is straightforward as we only need the 
incentive constraint of the broker-financier in the lowest type (as shown in proposition 2). 
The pooling equilibria essentially remain the same.  
 To find a separating equilibrium, we assume that the types are characterized by a 
random variable, K, uniformly distributed on an interval [c , d]. As before, the broker-
financier knows the types of all firms whereas outsiders (market) do not have this 
information. The game remains essentially the same with one difference. Instead of choosing 
from two types in the beginning of each period, nature now chooses from infinity many 
types.  
Proposition 3 identifies a unique separating equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3 A unique separating equilibrium exists in which the types are correctly 
revealed by the amount of badla financing provided: 
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Proof. The broker-financier solves the following optimization problem in each type of 
stock. He chooses B to maximize his total payoff in each stock. 
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The first order condition is: 
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By re-arranging the first order condition: 
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where z is the constant of integration. 
 
The middle term can be re-arranged as: 
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Since there is no incentive to signal the lowest type, cK )0(  
Hence, 
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Using integration by parts, 
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Substituting (14) in (13), 
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It follows, 
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Substituting (15) in (12), 
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Since there is no incentive to provide a signal in the lowest type, that is, B=0 for the lowest 
type, we have: 
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Finally, solving for K(B), 
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(18) permits full discrimination of types and there is no incentive to signal a false type. 
 
▄ 
 
Badla has been banned in both India and Pakistan, primarily, because of the ripple effects of 
the counterparty risk. When badla borrowers default, broker-financiers are hit, and if brokers 
default as a result, it causes panic. So, the counterparty risk embedded in badla finance 
directly contributes to the systematic risk. Consequently, the overall risk perception of the 
market is adversely affected. However, badla has its benefits too, primarily, it may serve the 
purpose of information transmission as identified in this paper. The emergence and long life 
of badla is an example of market‟s ability to find creative solutions when faced with serious 
information asymmetries. Perhaps, other emerging markets, have responded in their own 
unique ways, and found ways to transmit information.  
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3. Conclusion 
 
We have considered a peculiar COT facility associated with prominent equity markets in 
South Asia. The instrument known as badla may actually be an institutional response to the 
information gap existing in these markets. The information gaps in these emerging markets 
tend to be fairly serious since legal and institutional pre-conditions for proper information 
flows are not present in these markets. Badla may serve a useful purpose by eliminating such 
information gaps.  
Information transmission is a serious consideration, especially for emerging markets 
as severe information asymmetries are likely to exist in developing markets. The model 
presented here illustrates that, perhaps, these markets are responding to the challenge in their 
own unique ways. Identifying such mechanisms in other emerging markets is an interesting 
task for future research. 
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